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ABSTRACT 
Providing privacy protection for ubiquitous environments is a 
complex task that has only recently has become a hot topic. In 
this paper we describe the current state of our privacy-
enhancing infrastructure and address some issues that have 
arisen during its evolution. In particular we contrast users’ 
online and offline privacy concerns, and their perceived and 
actual performance in configuring access control mechanisms. 
We also present a brief assessment of cryptographic 
performance on small devices. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
Privacy concerns have been expressed since the birth of 
ubiquitous computing [1]. Yet it is only in the last couple of 
years that research into privacy protection for ubiquitous 
computing has really taken off. Though work in this area is still 
very much in its infancy, the variety of existing research 
[2][3][4] shows that privacy is not a simple issue that can easily 
be addressed. Privacy issues surround all aspects of ubiquitous 
computing and must be taken into account throughout the 
design. This paper will describe our privacy-enhancing 
infrastructure for context-awareness and present some of the 
issues that have arisen during its development.   
2. PRIVACY POSITION 
The foundation of our infrastructure is the beliefs held and the 
assumption made about privacy with respect to ubiquitous and 
context-aware computing. Throughout this work we think of 
privacy in terms of information flow. The adopted definition is 
“Privacy is the claim of individuals, groups, or institutions to 
determine for themselves when, how, and to what extent 
information about them is communicated to others” [5]. As 
such, the ownership of information is with the subject. It is thus 
important to note that privacy does not equal isolation, nor is 
this desirable. Rather, the issue is one of control.  
Control can only extend to the point of information release. 
Once released the subject cannot control how information is 
used. The process of releasing information is therefore thought 
to be like a business transaction where the disclosure of 
information follows some form of agreement that governs how 
the information will be used. Such agreement can be explicitly 
stated, though often it will be determined implicitly by cultural 
and social norms, existing relationship between the parties, etc. 
An important factor in determining whether or not to release 
information is therefore the trust placed in the recipient 
regarding their intention to honour such an agreement, whether 
explicit or not. Legislation requiring adherence to explicit 
agreements may offer extended protection beyond the point of 
release, but enforcement would be difficult so it might at best 
act as a deterrent against improper use.  
The difficulty of achieving perfect privacy protection should 
not discourage the provision of some protection. The offline 
world, with which we interact everyday, provides far from 
perfect privacy given the extensive use of technologies like 
credit cards, loyalty cards, mobile phones, CCTV, etc. 
Ubiquitous computing systems should at least aim to uphold 
similar levels of privacy.  
3. CONTEXT-AWARE SYSTEMS 
Our work on privacy has focused on context-aware systems. 
This field is especially interesting in terms of privacy because 
much of the information used is personal and, often, sensitive. 
Brown and Jones go so far as to state that “Context-aware 
applications, above all others in the pervasive field, can be 
regarded as anti-privacy” [6]. 
The most well known context-aware applications are those that 
use location, but context can be much more [7]. The definition 
we use states that: context is information related to an entity, 
where the information may include other entities. An entity can 
be anything from “people, places, and things” [8] to activities 
and concepts. What is important is the existence of 
relationships linking entities, or entities and values, in a 
potentially extensive network.  
4. INFRASTRUCTURE 
In our privacy-enhancing infrastructure, each entity has at least 
one associated Context Manager (CM). Multiple synchronised 
CMs can, if necessary, be employed in distributed 
environments. A CM acts as a point through which all context 
information owned by the associated entity flows. It is the CM 
that is responsible for providing privacy protection, storage, and 
handling of context information.  
Applications (agents) can be either context consumers (clients) 
or context producers (services). Depending on their type, agents 
communicate with the CM to either retrieve or store context 
information. The collection and use of context is separated, as 
others [9] have found desirable. This approach simplifies the 
development of applications as they need only consider the 
usage of context and the underlying mechanism for gathering 
context. 
Communication is an important aspect of the infrastructure. To 
support heterogeneous devices with unknown and variable 
connectivity, a component-based approach has been used with 
plug-ins to support different communication media. The 
infrastructure does not rely on external security as, even when 
network security is present, it may be deemed to be inadequate 
or flawed [10]. Instead cipher plug-ins are used to secure the 
communication. These, rather than a fixed cipher, ensure that 
differences in requirements and legislation may be supported, 
and allows use of custom cryptographic processors if available. 
5. APPLICATIONS 
A number of simple applications have been developed to use 
the infrastructure, including an iButton Context Capture 
application for gathering information, a Context-Aware Desk 
Display that shows information about the occupier, and a Web 
Presence application for publishing context information. 
The iButton Context Capture application uses iButtons [11] to 
gather context information. iButtons are small, uniquely 
identifiable, devices. They may contain memory or have 
abilities like temperature sensing. iButtons may be identified 
and their memory content or sensor values read by a PDA with 
an adapter. The identity can be used to look up logically linked 
context information. 
 
Figure 1: Context-Aware Desk Display 
The Context-Aware Desk Display consists of an enclosed TINI 
[12] microcontroller with an attached LCD and keypad. The 
display has been designed with the ordinary name tag 
sometimes found on desks in mind. As well as displaying the 
name of the person occupying the desk it also displays 
additional context information like the person’s email address, 
if they are in today or when they are expected to be in next. The 
information is collected from the person’s CM and the 
application can easily be extended to display more information. 
It has long been the vision of projects such as Cooltown [8] that 
every entity should have a web presence. The Web Presence 
Application provides this for entities in our infrastructure. 
Although the CM itself can be seen to provide a form of web 
presence, it is not directly accessible by standard web browsers. 
Thus the Web Presence Application provides the link between a 
CM and web browser. 
6. EXTERNAL INTEGRATION 
Being able to integrate this privacy-enhancing infrastructure 
with other external infrastructures is something we previously 
identified as desirable [13]. The idea is to utilise existing sensor 
networks and application, e.g. those in a context-aware office or 
in a smart home, whenever possible instead of having to 
develop and deploy duplicates. Such integration can be 
achieved by the use of a proxy. The proxy is responsible for 
translation and communication of information between the 
infrastructures. The proxy can be developed as part of either 
infrastructure or as separate application if desired. 
We have developed a single two-way proxy to integrate this 
infrastructure with that of another [14], also developed at Kent. 
The proxy is a plug-in resource to the privacy-enhancing 
infrastructure thus not requiring any changes to be made to 
either infrastructure. Since resources are able, given the proper 
access, to detect context events it is capable of constantly 
keeping the external infrastructure up to date. Information is 
gathered from the external infrastructure by regularly querying 
it for information and looking for changes. This could be made 
more efficient if desired by for instance using two single-way 





Figure 2: Integration with external infrastructure 
Independent of how and where the proxy is deployed it is 
subject to the same access control mechanism as a service or 
client. Hence integration also has the advantage of allowing the 
privacy protection mechanisms to be applied to otherwise 
unprotected infrastructures. Although information would still 
flow freely within the unprotected infrastructure, control is 
gained over access from the outside. The integration has 
allowed for greater flexibility in specifying access from the 
outside. 
7. PRIVACY PROTECTION 
So far, we have said little about the privacy protection 
mechanism utilised in the infrastructure beyond acknowledging 
its existence. An important aspect of privacy is the existence of 
an access control mechanism providing control over the 
information flow. Though other areas such as trust, 
authentication, etc. are also important this section will focus on 
the access control mechanisms evaluated as part of the 
development of this infrastructure. 
Our early work [15] used a Classification and Clearance 
Scheme (CCS) to control access. In this, each context element 
was assigned a classification level. The more sensitive, the 
higher it was classified, with a level of 0 indicating public 
information. Sites, services and other participants were each 
assigned an individual clearance value. The clearance given 
indicated the level of trust, and thus the maximum sensitivity of 
the information they could access. By default, unclassified 
information could not be accessed and recipients without 
clearance were limited to public information. Although working 
well with a small number of context elements and consumers 
the mechanism is limited by scalability problems. 
The mechanism employed in the current infrastructure uses 
Role Based Access Control (RBAC) [16] instead as this allows 
for better scalability. The idea behind RBAC is to use roles to 
group permissions together and thus to make administration 
easier. Our implementation is based on the RBAC0 [16], but 
with an important difference. For simplicity we have opted to 
use an automatic role activation mechanism. Agents will always 
be granted the best possible access given their current set of 
roles. In our RBAC mechanism the permissions that make up 
roles are implemented as lists of access controls. Each access 
control grants access to one context item. Any combination of 
read, write, and history access can be specified, including none 
of them. In the case of history access a limit can be set on how 
far back access is granted. For further customisation we have 
introduced the possibility of agents being assigned a personal 
permission that overrides the access granted by general roles. 
8. FINDINGS 
A number of interesting issues have arisen during the course of 
this work, some of which are discussed here.  
Firstly, we began by assuming that people want to enjoy the 
same level of privacy online as they do offline. This assumption 
set the target level of protection that we have worked towards. 
However a survey of potential users appears to indicate that this 
may not always be true. The responses showed 97% being 
either very concerned or concerned about their privacy when 
online. In contrast, only 71% expressed similar levels of 
concern about their offline privacy. The sample size is currently 
small (31 responses) and shows a bias towards computer and 
Internet literate people, yet there appears to be a clear 
difference here: people seem to be more concerned about their 
privacy online than offline. Why this is the case is still unclear. 
Perhaps it is because people fear the unknowns that are 
encountered with new technology? Another hypothesis is that 
the greater concerns exist due to a lack of trust in online 
technology, its providers, and beliefs about the way personal 
information is handled online. It is not hard to imagine people 
at the receiving end of malicious online activities, e.g. spam 
and viruses, to lose faith in any online technology. Irrespective 
of the origin of such a heightened concern, the implications are 
not good. We may have missed the opportunity to form an early 
relationship of trust between the technology, its users and 
providers. This can potentially have a negative impact on the 
wider acceptability and desirability of ubiquitous technology. It 
may also mean that new technology will be more thoroughly 
inspected and possibly judged harder than traditional 
technologies. Although the sample size is limited, the clear 
distinction between the subjects’ online and offline concerns 
suggests that this may indeed be a wider phenomenon.   
Secondly, our survey also provides some interesting findings 
about the CCS and the RBAC mechanisms described above. 
We asked who should be allowed to access information 
regarding the respondent’s location, activity, and contact 
details. We then asked them to express these preferences using 
both the CCS and RBAC mechanisms. The results showed that, 
on average, the setup of the CCS mechanism was 79% accurate 
whereas that for the RBAC mechanism was 87%. Thus the 
RBAC was more accurately setup to represent the subjects’ 
preferences. This makes sense since the preferences that can be 
expressed using the CCS mechanism are limited to a single list 
of classifications. However, when asked how accurately they 
felt they had been able express their preferences 65% stated that 
they had been able to express their preferences either very 
accurately or accurately with the CCS mechanism whilst for the 
RBAC mechanism the figure was only 48%. Hence the subjects 
felt that they had been able to express their preferences more 
accurately using the CCS mechanism, when in fact the opposite 
was true. The subjects found it easier to express their 
preferences using the CCS mechanism. These results provide an 
indication that it may be difficult for people to see the real 
effect, at any particular state, of an access control mechanism. 
It also suggests that people may not always be aware of how 
accurately they have managed to setup their privacy protection 
and that ease of use may be misleading. Another worrying 
finding was that in the event of the access control mechanism 
being inaccurately setup it most often resulted in too high 
access being granted. In the case of CCS 70% of the 
inaccuracies caused too high access, the corresponding figure 
for RBAC was 68%. Thus in the cases where people mistakenly 
feel they have setup a protection mechanism accurately the 
consequences are likely to be a false sense of protection. This in 
turn may cause people to mistrust the technology if they later 
come to realise that their expectations have not been meet.  
Finally, it is not uncommon for the performance of 
cryptography operations to be questioned in ubiquitous 
computing. So far we have described how the infrastructure 
uses cipher plug-ins to secure communications. The main plug-
in used here employs both an asymmetric cipher, RSA [17], and 
symmetric cipher, AES [18]. The RSAAES plug-in, as we will 
refer to it, aims to strike a balance between security, 
manageable key distribution, and performance. It has been 
developed in Personal Java, just as the infrastructure, and uses 
the Bouncy Castle crypto package [19]. The experiences gained 
from the development and use the RSAAES plug-in in our 
infrastructure suggest that, although resources are limited, 
reasonable levels of performance may be achieved on the 
targeted devices. Benchmarks have shown, not unexpectedly, 
that the most time consuming operation to be the RSA key 
generation. The table below show the average time to generate 
a keypair with the respective key sizes on two different 
generations of handhelds as well as on a PC. 
512-bits 1024-bits 2048-bits
iPAQ 3660 1085 6147 44320 
iPAQ 4150 636 4249 32615 
Evo N1015 66 1235 12035 
Figure 3: RSA key generation time in ms (average of 5 runs) 
Given that the key size recommended by RSA Laboratories 
[20] for general use, at the time of writing, is 1024-bits then we 
end up in the region of 4-7 seconds. Keypairs can, however, be 
reused provided that the private key has not compromised, so 
the achieved performance is more than adequate. Of more 
importance is the time it takes to encrypt and decrypt a message 
since this will always delay communication. The table below 
shows the average time, over 5 runs, to encrypt or decrypt 
15000 bytes of randomly generated data. The real message 
sizes used in the infrastructure vary from request to request 
with common examples about 1000 bytes. However message 
size increases with the complexity of a request, so to show that 
even complex messages can be handled, a larger message size 
was used in the benchmark. Throughout the benchmark the 
AES key size were fixed at its maximum length, 256-bits. 
512-bits 1024-bits 2048-bits
iPAQ 3660 573 / 921 592 / 1056 788 / 1851 
iPAQ 4150 255 / 346 223 / 621 277 / 979 
Evo N1015 20 / 30 18 / 54 20 / 140 
Figure 4: RSAAES encryption/decryption time in ms 
Progress in manufacturing faster devices makes significant 
differences. The iPAQ 3660 takes roughly twice the time to 
perform the same operation as the newer iPAQ 4150. Given the 
often short validity of context information, one could reduce the 
key size as appropriate. Any gain in performance would have to 
take into consideration, though, the shorter life span of the 
keypair. It should also be noted, as stated previously, that so far 
in our infrastructure the majority of the requests are 
significantly smaller. This reduces the encryption/decryption 
time, for example on the iPAQ 4150 the average time for the 
respective operations are 105/295 ms with a 1024-bits key and 
1000 bytes of data. In comparison to other processes yet to be 
optimised, the impact on performance incurred by the use of the 
RSAAES plug-in is largely insignificant. In an ideal world the 
complete encryption/decryption process on both sides should 
take less than a second, including the fulfilment of the request 
itself. Although this is as yet hard to achieve between two 
handhelds, the overall performance is still reasonable. 
9. FURTHER WORK 
Our findings highlight a number of areas requiring further 
investigation.  
To develop privacy protection mechanisms that meet the end 
users' needs and expectations we must know what they want, 
and what level and forms of intrusion they will accept. Our 
survey indicated that people were more concerned about online 
than offline privacy. Once people begin to experience 
ubiquitous technology a finer distinction, which includes 
ubicomp, can be made. Will this show similar, or increased, 
concerns about ubicomp to those for online technology? Also, 
what other factors influence the level of concern? What will 
happen as potentially invasive technologies creep into people's 
lives? Will their awareness and tolerance of privacy invasion 
change? These are just some of the question that need to be 
addressed. 
Currently under development is an extension to the existing 
RBAC mechanism that introduces the concept of a Privacy 
Invasive Value (PIV) [21]. The PIV is based on the idea that 
any disclosure of context information invades a subject’s 
privacy, whilst the extent of the invasion varies. This permits 
further customisation of the privacy protection as factors like 
when information is released, under what circumstances, how 
often, etc. can be used in addition to the current “about what” 
and “to whom”. The PIV is seen as a first step in the quest to 
provide an access control mechanism with the capabilities 
needed to provide privacy beyond the level enjoyed offline. By 
using a measurement of invasiveness rather than introducing 
more types of roles, we hope to maintain some of the ease of 
use that our survey indicated for CCS. Further work is required, 
though, to establish the full potential of the PIV approach. 
Our survey indicated that the users’ perceptions of their ability 
and success in setting up the privacy protection mechanisms did 
not match their actual performance, even with limited context 
elements and recipients. We anticipate that with further study of 
the HCI and usability aspects of privacy systems this can be 
improved upon. Maybe some ways of presenting privacy 
choices are better than others? Perhaps an intelligent feedback 
system would help?  
Finally, there is the issue of cryptography. Even though 
increasing processing power of limited devices will gradually 
improve the cryptographic performance, the real effect will be 
offset if larger keys are required to maintain the same level of 
security. Similarly, if battery life fails to keep pace with 
increased processor and memory capacity. Thus we may need 
to investigate using alternatives, e.g. specialised cryptographic 
hardware, to gain significant improvements in performance. 
10. CONCLUSION 
We have here presented some observations resulting from the 
development of our privacy-enhancing infrastructure for 
context-awareness. Firstly, in a survey we have found an 
indication that people are more concerned about their privacy 
online than offline. The level of protection required may be 
higher than previously assumed. Secondly, we have found that 
peoples’ perceptions of their ability to setup CCS and RBAC 
mechanisms differ from the accuracy that was achieved. Also 
when inaccuracies occurred, most resulted in too high access 
being granted. We find this worrying as it indicates that people 
may experience a false sense of protection which has the 
potential to undermine their trust in ubiquitous systems. Finally 
we have shown that reasonable cryptographic performance is 
achievable using limited devices. 
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